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Abstract. AI algorithms, and machine learning (ML) techniques in
particular, are increasingly important to individuals’ lives, but have
caused a range of privacy concerns addressed by, e.g., the European
GDPR. Using cryptographic techniques, it is possible to perform in-
ference tasks remotely on sensitive client data in a privacy-preserving
way: the server learns nothing about the input data and the model pre-
dictions, while the client learns nothing about the ML model (which
is often considered intellectual property and might contain traces
of sensitive data). While such privacy-preserving solutions are rel-
atively efficient, they are mostly targeted at neural networks, can
degrade the predictive accuracy, and usually reveal the network’s
topology. Furthermore, existing solutions are not readily accessible
to ML experts, as prototype implementations are not well-integrated
into ML frameworks and require extensive cryptographic knowledge.
In this paper, we present CryptoSPN, a framework for privacy-
preserving inference of sum-product networks (SPNs). SPNs are a
tractable probabilistic graphical model that allows a range of ex-
act inference queries in linear time. Specifically, we show how to
efficiently perform SPN inference via secure multi-party computa-
tion (SMPC) without accuracy degradation while hiding sensitive
client and training information with provable security guarantees.
Next to foundations, CryptoSPN encompasses tools to easily trans-
form existing SPNs into privacy-preserving executables. Our empiri-
cal results demonstrate that CryptoSPN achieves highly efficient and
accurate inference in the order of seconds for medium-sized SPNs.
1 INTRODUCTION
In our increasingly connected world, the abundance of user informa-
tion and availability of data analysis techniques originating from ar-
tificial intelligence (AI) research has brought machine learning (ML)
techniques into daily life. While these techniques are already de-
ployed in many applications like credit scoring, medical diagnosis,
biometric verification, recommender systems, fraud detection, and
language processing, emerging technologies such as self-driving cars
will further increase their popularity.
Privacy Concerns for ML Applications. These examples show
that progress in AI research certainly has improved user experience,
potentially even saving lives when employed for medical or safety
purposes. However, as the prevalent usage in modern applications
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often requires the processing of massive amounts of sensitive infor-
mation, the impact on user privacy has come into the public spotlight.
This culminated in privacy regulations such as the European Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into effect
in 2018. Not only does the GDPR provide certain requirements to
protect user data, it also includes restrictions on decisions based on
user data, which may be interpreted as a “right to explanation” [17].
Luckily, new deep probabilistic models that encode the joint dis-
tribution, such as sum-product networks (SPNs) [36], can indicate
whether the model is fit to predict the data at hand, or raise a warn-
ing otherwise. This increases trust as they “know when they do not
know”. Moreover, SPNs can also perform inference with missing in-
formation [35], an important aspect for real-life applications.
Generally, probabilistic graphical models [24] provide a frame-
work for understanding what inference and learning are, and have
therefore emerged as one of the principal theoretical and practical ap-
proaches to ML and AI [14]. However, one of the main challenges in
probabilistic modeling is the trade-off between the expressivity of the
models and the complexity of performing various types of inference,
as well as learning them from data. This inherent trade-off is clearly
visible in powerful – but intractable – models like Markov ran-
dom fields, (restricted) Boltzmann machines, (hierarchical) Dirich-
let processes, and variational autoencoders. Despite these models’
successes, performing inference on them resorts to approximate rou-
tines. Moreover, learning such models from data is generally harder
as inference is a sub-routine of learning, requiring simplified assump-
tions or further approximations. Having guarantees on tractability at
inference and learning time is therefore a highly desired property in
many real-world scenarios.
Tractable graphical models such as SPNs guarantee exactly this:
performing exact inference for a range of queries. They compile
probabilistic inference routines into efficient computational graphs
similar to deep neural networks, but encode a joint probability dis-
tribution. As a result, they can not only be used for one ML task,
but support many different tasks by design, ranging from outlier de-
tection (joint distribution) to classification or regression (conditional
inference). They have been successfully used in numerous real-world
applications such as image classification, completion and generation,
scene understanding, activity recognition, and language and speech
modeling. Despite these successes, it is unclear how one can develop
an SPN framework that is GDPR-friendly.
As a naive solution, SPN tasks can be performed only on client
devices to ensure that no sensitive information is handed out, but
this requires the service provider to ship a trained model to clients,
thereby giving up valuable intellectual property and potentially leak-
ing sensitive data as such models often contain traces of sensitive
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Figure 1. Conventional MLaaS (top) vs. private ML inference (bottom) on
client feature vectorX using the server’s model P . In private ML inference,
the input of both client and server is protected with a cryptographic SMPC
protocol: the parties learn only encrypted values X˜ and P˜ , respectively.
training data, e.g., due to unintended memorization [7]. Therefore,
current “ML as a Service” (MLaaS) applications usually send and
hence leak client data to a remote server operated by the service
provider to perform inference (cf. top of Figure 1).
Even if the service provider and the remote server are consid-
ered trustworthy, the privacy of clients can still be compromised
by breaches, hacks, and negligent or malicious insiders. Such inci-
dents occur frequently even at high-profile companies: recently, Mi-
crosoft Outlook was hacked [45] and AT&T’s customer support was
bribed [29]. Thus, it is not enough to protect client data just from
outsiders, it must also be hidden from the server to ensure privacy.
Previously, protecting the identity of individuals via anonymiza-
tion techniques was seen as sufficient when learning on or inferring
from data of a collection of users. Such techniques reduce raw data to
still enable extraction of knowledge without individuals being identi-
fiable. However, recent works conclude that current de-identification
measures are insufficient and unlikely satisfy GDPR standards [41].
Cryptography for ML Applications. We believe this indicates
that cryptographic measures should be employed to satisfy today’s
privacy demands. The cryptographic literature has actively developed
protocols and frameworks for efficient and privacy-preserving ML in
the past years. So far, efforts were focused on deep/convolutional
neural networks, see [38] for a recent systematization of knowledge.
There, usually a scenario is considered where the server holds a
model and performs private ML inference on a client’s data, with no
information except for the inference result being revealed to the
client (cf. bottom of Figure 1).
Existing frameworks mostly rely on homomorphic encryp-
tion (HE), secure multi-party computation (SMPC), or a combination
of both, to enable private inference with various security, resource,
and usage properties. As many ML tasks today already require in-
tense computational resources, the overhead incurred by introducing
cryptographic privacy mechanisms is substantial. Though a line of
prominent frameworks from CryptoNets [15] to XONN [39] has es-
tablished increased efficiency and relatively low execution times for
private inference, research has mainly focused on NNs by looking
for efficient ways to securely compute common activation functions,
sometimes degrading accuracy by using more efficient approxima-
tions. Existing frameworks only possess a low degree of automation
and often require very low-level model descriptions, making it hard
for non-experts to run private inference using their own models. Ad-
ditionally, for approaches using SMPC, it is very common that the
topology of the NN is leaked, which might reveal some model infor-
mation to the client.
Our Contributions. In this work, we present foundations and
tools for privacy-preserving ML in the unexplored domain of sum-
product networks (SPNs). Our framework, which we call Crypto-
SPN, demonstrates that SPNs can very well be protected with
cryptographic measures. Specifically, after presenting the necessary
background for private ML and SPNs (Section 2), we show how
to efficiently perform private SPN inference using SMPC (Sec-
tion 3). We combine techniques from both AI and applied cryptog-
raphy to achieve this. Contrary to popular SMPC-based approaches
for protecting NNs, ours leaks no information from the network
topology by using Random Tensorized SPNs (RAT-SPNs) [35].
We implement CryptoSPN using the state-of-the-art SMPC frame-
work ABY [12] and provide an open-source tool that can trans-
form SPN instances from the SPFlow framework [33] into privacy-
preserving executables (Section 4). CryptoSPN is easily usable
by non-experts and intended to make private ML available to
the broader AI community working on a wide range of sophisti-
cated models. In an experimental evaluation (Section 5), we show
that CryptoSPN performs private inference in reasonable time while
preserving accuracy. With our work, we push private ML be-
yond NNs and bring attention to the crucial, emerging task of making
a variety of ML applications private.
2 BACKGROUND
We start with the necessary background on secure computation, ex-
isting privacy-preserving ML solutions, and SPNs.
2.1 Secure Computation (SC) of ML Tasks
First described by [46], the concept of secure computation (SC) lets
computational parties (e.g., a client and a server) evaluate arbitrary
functions on secret inputs without leaking any information but the
results. For example, a server can calculate statistics on client data
without learning the raw data, or a group of clients can jointly sched-
ule meetings without revealing their availability. The SC research
community has put forth efficient schemes with practical implemen-
tations for applications that rely on homomorphic encryption (HE) or
secure multi-party computation (SMPC). The former allows compu-
tations directly on encrypted data, whereas in SMPC an interactive
protocol is executed between parties that, in the end, reveals only the
desired output. A general rule of thumb is that SMPC requires more
communication, whereas computation is the bottleneck for HE. In
this work, we rely on secure two-party computation, i.e., SMPC with
two parties: client and server.
2.1.1 Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning
We shortly recapitulate the most influential works for preserving pri-
vacy when performing machine learning tasks using SC techniques.
Privacy-preserving neural network inference was first pro-
posed in [34, 42, 3]. Secure classification via hyper-plane deci-
sion, naive Bayes, and decision trees was presented in [5]. Se-
cureML [31] provides SMPC-friendly linear regression, logistic re-
gression, and neural network training using SGD as well as se-
cure inference. With CryptoNets [15], the race for the fastest NN-
based privacy-preserving image classification began: MiniONN [28],
Chameleon [40], Gazelle [20], XONN [39], and DELPHI [30] are
only some of the proposed frameworks.
These frameworks mostly offer privacy-preserving
deep/convolutional neural network inference based on HE or SMPC
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protocols, or even combinations of both techniques in different
computational and security models. However, they are not readily
accessible to ML experts, as prototype implementations are not well-
integrated into ML frameworks and require extensive cryptographic
knowledge to secure applications. Moreover, these frameworks are
often engineered towards delivering outstanding performance for
benchmarks with certain standard data sets (e.g., MNIST [26]), but
fail to generalize in terms of accuracy and performance. There are
some but very few attempts to directly integrate privacy technology
into ML frameworks: for TensorFlow there exists rudimentary
support for differential privacy [1], HE [44], and SMPC [10], and
for Intel’s nGraph compiler there exists an HE backend [4]. Very
recenty, Facebook’s AI researchers released CrypTen [18], which
provides an SMPC integration with PyTorch. However, currently not
much is known about the underlying cryptographic techniques and,
therefore, its security guarantees.
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) are an intriguing alter-
native to cryptographic protocols. They use hardware features to
shield sensitive data processing tasks. TEEs are widely available,
e.g., via Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX), and therefore are
explored for efficiently performing ML tasks [25]. Unfortunately, In-
tel SGX provides no provable security guarantees and requires soft-
ware developers to manually incorporate defenses against software
side-channel attacks, which is extremely difficult. Moreover, severe
attacks on Intel SGX allowed to extract private data from the TEE,
making SGX less secure than cryptographic protocols [8].
2.1.2 SMPC
In SMPC, the function f to be computed securely is represented as
a Boolean circuit consisting of XOR and AND gates: each gate is se-
curely computed based on the encrypted outputs of preceding gates,
and only the values of the output wires of the entire circuit are de-
crypted to obtain the overall output. The intermediate results leak no
information and only the outputs are decrypted by running a corre-
sponding sub-protocol.
The literature considers two security settings: semi-honest, where
the involved parties are assumed to honestly follow the protocol
but want to learn additional information about other parties’ inputs,
and malicious, which even covers active deviations from the proto-
col. SMPC protocols are usually divided into two phases: a setup
phase that can be performed independently of the inputs (e.g., dur-
ing off-peak hours or at night), and an online phase that can only
be executed once the inputs are known. Most of the “expensive” op-
erations can be performed in the setup phase in advance such that
the online phase is very efficient. Two prominent SMPC protocols
are Yao’s garbled circuit (GC) [46] and the GMW protocol [16]. As
we heavily rely on floating-point operations with high-depth circuits,
we use Yao’s GC protocol, which has a constant round complex-
ity (the round complexity of the GMW protocol depends on the cir-
cuit depth and, hence, is not suited for our case).
2.1.3 Yao’s GC
We present a schematic overview for the secure evaluation of a single
gate in Figure 2 and refer to [27] for further technical details.
The central idea of this protocol is to encode the function (more
precisely, its representation as a Boolean circuit) and the inputs such
that the encoding reveals no information about the inputs but can still
be used to evaluate the circuit. This encoding is called “garbling” and
individual garbled values can be seen as encryptions. We will use the
common notation of g˜ and x˜, y˜ to refer to a garbled gate or garbled
inputs, respectively. The evaluation of the garbled circuit C˜ (consist-
ing of many garbled gates) using the garbled inputs, in turn, results
in an encoding z˜ = C˜(x˜, y˜) of the output. The encoded output can
only be decoded jointly to the plain value z = C(x, y), i.e., both
parties have to agree to do so. In the protocol, one of the parties,
the “garbler”, is in charge of creating the garbled circuit. The other
party, the “evaluator”, obtains the garbled circuit, evaluates it, and
then both parties jointly reveal the output.
Circuit Garbling. The wires in the Boolean circuit C of a func-
tion f are assigned two randomly chosen labels / keys: k0 and k1,
indicating that the wire’s plain value is 0 or 1, respectively. Though
there is a label for each possible value {0, 1}, only the garbled
value x˜ = kwx for the actual plain value x of wire w is used to evalu-
ate the garbled circuit. The garbler creates both labels and therefore
is the only one who knows the mapping to plaintext values – for the
evaluator, a single randomly-looking label reveals no information.
The garbler creates a randomly permuted “garbled” gate g˜ in the
form of an encrypted truth table for each gate g in the circuit C of f ,
and sends all garbled gates to the evaluator. The key idea is to use an
encryption scheme Enc that has two encryption keys. For each truth
table entry, the label associated with the plaintext value of the outgo-
ing wire is then encrypted using the labels associated with the plain
values of the two incoming wires as encryption keys (cf. Figure 2).
Evaluator Garbler
g˜
x = 0, y = 0 Enckw00 ,k
w1
0
(kw2g(0,0))
x = 0, y = 1 Enckw00 ,k
w1
1
(kw2g(0,1))
x = 1, y = 0 Enckw01 ,k
w1
0
(kw2g(1,0))
x = 1, y = 1 Enckw01 ,k
w1
1
(kw2g(1,1))
 in random order
Setup
Online
Input x Input y
y˜ = kw1y
Oblivious Transfer
kw00 , k
w0
1
x
x˜ = kw0x
z˜ = kw2g(x,y) = g˜(x˜, y˜)
Figure 2. Overview of Yao’s GC protocol for securely evaluating a binary
gate g (output wire w2) on binary inputs x (input wire w0) and y (input
wire w1), where g˜ is the garbled truth table. All labels kwa (corresponding
to wire w having value a) are generated uniformly at random by the garbler.
The protocol is composable and can be used to securely compute any circuit
based on the secure computation of one gate.
Garbled Circuit Evaluation. Now, if the evaluator is in posses-
sion of the labels x˜ and y˜ corresponding to the incoming wires’ val-
ues x and y, then exactly one entry of g˜ can be successfully decrypted
using x˜ and y˜ as decryption keys3. This will result in z˜ = g˜(x˜, y˜),
the label of the outgoing wire of g associated with the desired plain-
text value z = g(x, y). Since only the desired entry can be decrypted
and, given that the labels are chosen randomly and independently of
the wire values, the evaluator can perform this computation without
learning any plaintext information.
3 A special type of encryption scheme is used to detect if the decryption was
successful or not.
3
The remaining challenge is that the evaluator needs to obtain the
correct garbled inputs (i.e., the labels corresponding to its inputs)
without revealing the inputs to the garbler. This is solved by a cryp-
tographic protocol called oblivious transfer (OT), which enables one
party with input bit b to obliviously obtain a string sb from another
party holding two input strings s0, s1 without revealing b and learn-
ing anything about s1−b. With this building block, Yao’s GC protocol
is composed as follows (cf. Figure 2): In the setup phase, the garbler
creates all wire labels for the garbled circuit C˜ and sends C˜ to the
evaluator. During the online phase, the garbler sends the labels corre-
sponding to its input to the evaluator. The evaluator’s garbled inputs
are obtained via OT. Then, the evaluator decrypts C˜. The output can
be jointly decrypted if the parties reveal the output label associations.
Protocol Costs. Improvements on OT [19, 2] and the garbling
scheme [22, 47] have significantly reduced the overhead of Yao’s GC
protocol, making it viable to be used in applications. Specifically,
the GC created and sent in the setup phase requires 2κ bits per bi-
nary AND gate, where κ is the symmetric security parameter (e.g.,
κ = 128 for the currently recommended security level). For oblivi-
ously transferring the labels corresponding to the evaluator’s input x,
|x|κ bits must be sent in the setup phase, as well as |x|(2κ + 1)
bits in the online phase. Additionally, the labels for the garbler’s in-
put y must be sent in the online phase (|y|κ bits). The protocol only
requires a constant number of rounds of interaction.
2.2 Sum-Product Networks (SPNs)
Recent years have seen a significant interest in tractable probabilistic
representations such as Arithmetic Circuits (ACs) [9], Cutset Net-
works [37], and SPNs [36]. In particular, SPNs, an instance of ACs,
are deep probabilistic models that can represent high-treewidth mod-
els [48] and facilitate exact inference for a range of queries in
time linear in the network size.
2.2.1 Definition of SPNs
Formally, an SPN is a rooted directed acyclic graph, consisting
of sum, product, and leaf nodes. The scope of an SPN is the set
of random variables (RVs) appearing on the network. An SPN can
be defined recursively as follows: (1) a tractable univariate distri-
bution is an SPN; (2) a product of SPNs defined over different
scopes is an SPN; and (3) a convex combination of SPNs over the
same scope is an SPN. Thus, a product node in an SPN represents
a factorization over independent distributions defined over differ-
ent RVs P (X,Y ) = P (X)P (Y ), while a sum node stands for a
mixture of distributions defined over the same variables P (X,Y ) =
wP1(X,Y ) + (1 − w)P2(X,Y ). From this definition, it follows
that the joint distribution modeled by such an SPN is a valid normal-
ized probability distribution [36].
2.2.2 Tractable Inference in SPNs
To answer probabilistic queries in an SPN, we evaluate the nodes
starting at the leaves. Given some evidence, the probability output
of querying leaf distributions is propagated bottom up. For product
nodes, the values of the child nodes are multiplied and propagated to
their parents. For sum nodes, we sum the weighted values of the child
nodes. The value at the root indicates the probability of the asked
query. To compute marginals, i.e., the probability of partial config-
urations, we set the probability at the leaves for those variables to 1
+
× ×
w˜1 w˜2
λ˜1 λ˜2 λ˜3 λ˜4
X˜1 X˜2 X˜3 X˜4
Oblivious Selection Network


(2)(1)
(3) (1)
Figure 3. CryptoSPN protocol flow for an exemplary miniature SPN
with Poisson leaves: (1) client and server have private inputs X1,...,4
andw1,2, λ1,...,4, respectively; (2) private evaluation of leaf-, sum- and prod-
uct nodes using SMPC; (3) client receives SPN inference result.
and then proceed as before. This allows us to also compute condi-
tional queries such as P (Y |X) = P (X,Y )/P (X). Finally, using
a bottom-up and top-down pass, we can compute approximate MPE
states [36]. All these operations traverse the tree at most twice and
therefore can be achieved in linear time w.r.t. the size of the SPN.
3 CryptoSPN INFERENCE
Given the AC structure of SPNs, SMPC is a fitting mechanism to
preserve privacy in SPN inference as it relies on securely evaluat-
ing a circuit. Compared to, e.g., NNs, SPNs do not have alternating
linear and non-linear layers, which would complicate the application
of SMPC protocols. Here, we are concerned with private SPN infer-
ence in a setting where the client has a private input and the server is
in possession of a model; in the end, the server learns nothing, and the
client only learns the inference result (cf. bottom of Figure 1). Unfor-
tunately, we cannot use the arithmetic version of the GMW protocol,
as it only provides integer or fixed-point operations, which is insuffi-
cient for tractable and normalized probabilistic inference such as the
case of SPNs. Instead, CryptoSPN uses Yao’s GC protocol that eval-
uates Boolean circuits, which allows us to use floating point opera-
tions by including Boolean sub-circuits corresponding to IEEE 754-
compliant 32- or 64-bit floating point operations [11] in the circuit
representation of the to-be-evaluated SPN.
3.1 Secure Evaluation of SPNs with SMPC
Our approach (cf. Figure 3) is to transform the SPN into a Boolean
circuit and to then evaluate it via SMPC. The server input con-
sists of all the model parameters of the SPN (i.e., weights for the
weighted sums and parameters for the leaf distribution), the client
input consists of the evidence, and the output is the root node
value. We perform all computations in the log-domain using the
well-known log-sum-exp trick, which also provides a runtime ad-
vantage for our SMPC approach as it replaces products with more
efficient additions. Contrary to the convention, we use the log2 do-
main in CryptoSPN since the circuits for log2 and exp2 operations
are significantly smaller than the natural log and exp operations.
Due to the SMPC security properties, all the model parameters
are hidden from the client and the input values or evidence from the
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server. However, this naive approach alone does not provide our de-
sired privacy guarantees since the circuit evaluated in SMPC is pub-
lic. Therefore, the topology of the SPN is leaked to the client, in-
cluding which RVs (the scope) are used in which leaves. Depending
on how the SPN was learned, this might reveal information about the
server’s model, such as correlations among RVs, number of mixtures,
etc. To hide this information, one could make use of generic private
function evaluation techniques such as incorporating universal cir-
cuits (UCs) [43]. UCs allow one party to choose a function as the
private input, which is then obliviously evaluated on the other party’s
input such that nothing about the function or the input is revealed.
Employing these generic techniques, however, would drastically in-
crease the overhead we introduce via SMPC. For this reason, the re-
lated work on SMPC for private NN inference usually assumes that
the NN topology is public, with the impact on model privacy being
unclear in this situation. To mitigate these concerns in CryptoSPN,
we tailor efficient techniques stemming from both AI as well as ap-
plied cryptography research specifically to SPNs. The first method
hides specifics of the training data by using Random Tensorized
SPNs (RAT-SPNs) [35], while the second method allows to hide the
scope of any existing SPN without the need to re-learn a RAT-SPN.
3.1.1 Hiding the Training Data
It is possible that the structure of a general SPN leaks information
about the training data. To hide any information that could be re-
vealed from the SPN structure, we propose to use RAT-SPNs [35].
The RAT-SPN structure is built randomly via region graphs. Given
a set of RVs X , a region R is defined as any non-empty subset
of X . Given any region R, a K-partition P of R is a collection
of K non-overlapping sub-regions R1, . . . ,RK , whose union is R,
i.e., P = {R1, . . . ,RK}, ∀k : Rk 6= ∅, ∀k 6= l : Rk ∩ Rl = ∅,⋃
kRk = R. This partitioning algorithm randomly splits the RVs.
Furthermore, we recursively split the regions until we reach a de-
sired partitioning depth. Here, we consider only 2-partitions. From
these region graphs, we can construct an SPN specifying the number
of uniform leaves per RV. Since the structure-building algorithm is
data-agnostic (it only knows the number of RVs in the dataset), there
is no information leakage. This also means that any initial random
structure for |X|, the number of random variables, is a valid initial
structure for any other dataset with the same number of dimensions.
After obtaining the structure, we use a standard optimization algo-
rithm for parameter estimation. The structure produced by the RAT-
SPN algorithm is regular, and the values of the parameters after the
optimization encode the knowledge needed to build the joint distri-
bution. In our scheme, the parameters are only visible to the service
provider. Using a random structure also enables us to choose the size
of the SPNs, which allows service providers to trade off model com-
plexity, efficiency, and accuracy.
3.1.2 Hiding the Scope
Since the scope of a node is defined by the scope of its children, it
suffices to hide the leaves’ scopes. Concretely, for each leaf, we have
to hide which Xj for j ∈ {1, . . . , n} from the client’s RVs X =
X1, . . . , Xn is selected. This corresponds to an oblivious array ac-
cess in each leaf, where an array can be accessed without revealing
the accessed location j. There exist efficient methods to do this based
on homomorphic encryption [6] or secure evaluation of selection net-
works [23] via SMPC. A recent study of private decision tree evalu-
ation [21] shows that selection networks outperform selection based
on HE in both total and online runtime. Hence, we obliviously se-
lect RVs via securely evaluating a selection network in CryptoSPN.
Similar to the usage in decision trees, we add just one selection
network below the SPN instead of selecting one variable per leaf.
That is, the variable input of the secure leaf computation (see be-
low) is the outcome of the selection network, which selects the vari-
ables Xφ(1), . . . , Xφ(m) for the m leaves in the SPN from the n
client inputs according to a server input φ : [m] 7→ [n] denoting
which leaf i ≤ m uses Xφ(i). If m ≥ n (which we assume is true
since RVs are usually used more than once), the complexity of such
a selection network is [23]:
Cseln,m =
1
2
(n+m) log2(n) +m log2(m)− n+ 1,
beating the trivial solution of O(nm). This requires |X|κ(n +
2Cseln,m) bits of setup communication and |X|n(2κ + 1) bits on-
line [21]. Hereby, one can hide the scope of any SPN, including
ones learned through other methods [13] (although the topology is
still leaked). We propose to use this approach to increase privacy in
cases where leaking the topology is deemed acceptable, or where re-
learning the structure of an already existing SPN is infeasible.
3.1.3 Hiding the RVs and Leaf Parameters
Because the secure computation of each floating point operation in-
troduces overhead, our approach at the leaf level is to let the re-
spective parties locally pre-compute as many terms as possible be-
fore inputting them into the secure SPN evaluation. For Gaussians in
the log2 domain, the result can be evaluated in SMPC with just two
multiplications and two additions based on the client’s RV input Xj
and server inputs µ, s1 = − log2(2piσ2), and s2 = log2(e)2σ2 based on
parameters mean µ and variance σ2:
P˜Gauss
(
Xj ;µ, σ
2) = s˜1 − (X˜j − µ˜)2 s˜2.
Thus, for each leaf, the SPN circuit requires CGaussb = 2(C
ADD
b +
CMULb ) AND gates, where C
OP
b denotes the number of AND gates
for a b-bit floating point operation OP, cf. [11]4. Additionally, for the
entire SPN, IC Gaussb = nb bits of client input and IS
Gauss
b = 3mb bits
of server input are added, where m is the amount of leaves and n is
the number of RVs.
Similarly, we can securely compute Poissons with just one mul-
tiplication and two additions based on the client’s RV inputs Xj
and c1 = − log2(Xj !), and server inputs s1 = log2(λ) and s2 =
−λ log2(e) based on mean λ:
P˜ Pois (Xj ;λ) = X˜j · s˜1 + c˜1 + s˜2.
This results in the leaf size CPoisb = 2C
ADD
b + C
MUL
b with input
sizes IC Poisb = 2nb and IS
Pois
b = 2mb for the entire SPN.
Bernoullis consist of just one MUX gate, selecting from two server
inputs p and q = 1− p based on the binary client RV input Xj :
P˜ Bern (Xj ; p) = MUX (X˜j , p˜, q˜) =
{
p˜, if Xj = 1
q˜, if Xj = 0
.
Hence, they have a complexity of |p| AND gates, yielding the
costs CBernb = b, IC
Bern
b = n, and IS
Bern
b = 2mb.
Due to the log2 domain, computations of a product node just in-
troduce a complexity of (ch(s)− 1)CADDb , where ch(s) denotes the
4 For instance, CADD32 = 1820, C
MUL
32 = 3016, C
EXP2
32 = 9740, and
CLOG232 = 10568.
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amount of children of a node s. For the same reason, the complexity
of a sum node is:
CLOG2b + (ch(s)− 1)CADDb + ch(s)(CADDb + CEXP2b ).
3.2 Efficiency
Putting all of the presented building blocks together, we get the
following amount of AND gates (the only relevant cost metric
for Yao’s GC protocol) for an SPN with n RVs and m leaves of
distribution D ∈ {Gauss, Pois,Bern} that operates with b-bit pre-
cision and consists of a set of sum nodes S and product nodes P ,
where ch(s) for s ∈ S∪P denotes the amount of children of node s:
CSPNb =mC
D
b +
∑
s∈S
(
CLOG2b + (ch(s)− 1)CADDb
+ ch(s)
(
CADDb + C
EXP2
b
))
+
∑
p∈P
(ch(p)− 1)CADDb .
In addition, we also have ICDb client input bits stemming from
the RVs and ISDb + b
∑
s∈S ch(s) server input bits stemming from
the leaf parameters as well as the sum weights. Therefore, us-
ing Yao’s GC protocol, CryptoSPN has the following communication
costs in bits in the setup phase:
κ
(
ICDb + 2C
SPN
b
)
and in the online phase:
κ
(
2ICDb + IS
D
b + b
∑
s∈S
ch(s)
)
+ ICDb ,
where κ is the symmetric security parameter (e.g., κ = 128).
If one does not use RAT-SPNs and instead our scope-hiding pri-
vate SPN evaluation, obliviously selecting the leaves’ RVs for Gaus-
sian, Poisson, and Bernoulli leaves has the following online commu-
nication, respectively: nb(2κ+ 1), 2nb(2κ+ 1), and n(κ+ 1) bits.
The setup communication is κb
(
n+ 2Cseln,m
)
, κb
(
2n+ 2Csel2n,m
)
,
and κ
(
n+ 2Cseln,m
)
bits, respectively.
3.3 Security Guarantees
As we use RAT-SPNs, the underlying structure, the size and depth
of the SPN are known to the client. However, this structure is ran-
domly generated and comes only from hyper-parameters. Therefore,
the structure is independent of training data and leaks no private in-
formation. The number of random variables is known by both parties,
as usual (e.g., [15, 20, 28, 30, 39, 40]). And while the value of the
input variables is hidden, the output is not and might reveal some
information but is data that inherently has to be revealed.
The protocols we use in our implementation of CryptoSPN are
provably secure in the semi-honest model [27]. In the studied setting,
it is reasonable to assume the server is semi-honest, as reputable ser-
vice providers are confined by regulations and potential audits. Fur-
thermore, detected malicious behaviour would hurt their reputation,
providing an economic incentive to behave honestly. However, these
regulations and incentives do not exist for the client’s device, which
can be arbitrarily modified by the client or harmful software.
Fortunately, CryptoSPN can easily be extended to provide security
against malicious clients as it relies on Yao’s GC protocol. There, the
only messages sent by the (potentially malicious) client are in the
oblivious transfer. Thus, one just needs to instantiate a maliciously
secure OT protocol to achieve security against malicious clients,
which incurs only a negligible performance overhead [2].
4 IMPLEMENTATION & SPFlow
INTEGRATION
We implemented CryptoSPN using the state-of-the-art SMPC frame-
work ABY [12] with the floating point operation sub-circuits of [11]
and the selection network circuit of [21]. ABY implements vari-
ous SMPC protocols in C++ and provides APIs for the secure evalua-
tion of supplied circuits within these protocols. It also supports single
instruction, multiple data (SIMD) instructions, which allows Crypto-
SPN to batch-process multiple queries at the same time. Notably,
like most other SMPC frameworks, ABY requires a very low-level
circuit description of the function that is computed securely, mak-
ing it hard for AI researchers and others without a background in
cryptography to actually perform private ML inference. Motivated
by this gap, we integrate CryptoSPN with SPFlow [33], an open-
source Python library that provides an interface for SPN learning,
manipulation, and inference. For users, CryptoSPN appears as an-
other SPFlow export that enables private SPN inference. Specifically,
CryptoSPN allows ML experts to easily transform an SPN in SPFlow
into a privacy-preserving ABY program with just the SPN as input.
The resulting ABY program can be compiled into an executable for
simple deployment on the client and server side. CryptoSPN is avail-
able at https://encrypto.de/code/CryptoSPN.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluate CryptoSPN on random SPNs trained with SPFlow
for the standard datasets provided in [13], and on regular SPNs
for nips, a count dataset from [32]. We evaluate models with
both 32- and 64-bit precision to study the trade-off between accu-
racy and efficiency. The experiments are performed on two machines
with Intel Core i9-7960X CPUs and 128GB of RAM. We use a sym-
metric security parameter of κ = 128 bits according to current rec-
ommendations. The connection between both machines is restricted
to 100Mbit/s bandwidth and a round-trip time of 100ms to simu-
late a realistic wide-area network (WAN) for a client-server setting.
Our benchmarks are given in Table 1. Compared to previous works
focused on NNs, we evaluate a variety of datasets, which shows that
CryptoSPN can easily transform any SPN into a privacy-preserving
version. In addition to the theoretical analysis of Section 3.2, we also
investigate RAT-SPNs of various sizes for the nltcs dataset of [13]
to gain a practical sense of how different SPN parameters affect our
runtime. Moreover, we use two regular SPNs trained for nips to see
how hiding the scope (cf. Section 3.1.2) increases the runtime.
Generally, our results shown in Table 1 demonstrate that we
achieve tractable setup and highly efficient online performance for
medium-sized SPNs. Specifically, the setup phase requires costs in
the order of minutes and gigabytes, while the online phase takes only
a few seconds and megabytes. Though multiple seconds might seem
like a significant slow-down in some cases, this is certainly justified
in many scenarios where privacy demands outweigh the costs of pri-
vacy protection (such as legal requirements for medical diagnostics).
While no single parameter appears to be decisive for the runtimes,
we observe that some parameters are much more significant:
1. The number of sums has a significantly larger effect than products
or leaves, which is expected given the log2 and exp2 operations.
But, since the absolute amount of sums is still relatively small, the
additional input weights do not affect online communication.
2. Though differences in the number of RVs, product nodes, leaves,
and edges do influence the runtimes, deviations have to be very
large to take an effect. For instance, when examining the SPNs
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Table 1. Benchmarks of private SPN inference with CryptoSPN in a WAN network. The SPN has |X| RVs, |S| sum nodes, and |P | product nodes. Setup
and online runtime as well as communication are measured for both 32- and 64-bit precision. All SPNs are RAT-SPNs with Bernoulli leaves except the ones for
nips, which are regular SPNs with Poisson leaves. † indicates usage of a selection network for hiding RV assignments.
dataset |X| |S| |P | #leaves #edges #layers setup (s) setup (GB) online (s) online (MB)
32b 64b 32b 64b 32b 64b 32b 64b
accidents 111 22 4420 11 100 27 161 7 365 825 4.34 9.83 22.5 55.5 15.5 30.9
baudio 100 22 4420 10 000 26 061 7 359 812 4.28 9.67 22.1 53.6 14.4 28.7
bbc 1058 2 880 42 320 44 721 5 248 577 2.95 6.87 18.6 41.9 43.8 87.5
bnetflix 100 2 4400 20 000 32 001 5 264 604 3.15 7.20 17.1 40.8 22.5 45.1
book 500 2 880 20 000 22 401 5 134 312 1.60 3.71 9.8 22.3 20.9 41.8
c20ng 910 2 880 36 400 38 801 5 218 524 2.59 6.03 16.4 37.6 37.7 75.4
cr52 889 10 1768 35 560 41 985 7 304 701 3.62 8.34 21.1 49.1 38.1 76.1
cwebkb 839 10 1768 33 560 39 985 7 294 677 3.50 8.06 20.6 46.8 36.0 72.0
dna 180 22 4420 18 000 34 061 7 400 907 4.76 10.81 24.4 59.4 22.5 45.1
jester 100 2 4400 20 000 32 001 5 264 604 3.15 7.20 17.1 40.9 22.5 45.1
kdd 64 10 1768 2560 8985 7 137 308 1.62 3.67 8.5 20.8 4.3 8.5
kosarek 190 2 2200 19 000 25 001 5 178 410 2.12 4.87 12.3 28.7 20.5 41.0
msnbc 17 10 1768 680 7105 7 127 285 1.51 3.40 8.0 19.1 2.3 4.7
msweb 294 22 4420 29 400 45 461 7 458 1042 5.45 12.42 29.1 69.0 34.2 68.4
plants 69 2 4400 13 800 25 801 5 233 531 2.77 6.32 14.7 35.3 16.2 32.4
pumsb star 163 2 4400 32 600 44 601 5 328 754 3.91 8.98 22.1 52.0 35.4 70.9
tmovie 500 10 1768 20 000 26 425 7 225 515 2.68 6.14 14.9 35.2 22.1 44.3
tretail 135 2 4400 27 000 39 001 5 300 688 3.57 8.19 19.8 47.2 29.7 59.4
nltcs
16 2 880 640 3041 5 36 81 0.43 0.96 2.7 5.8 1.1 2.1
16 2 2200 1600 7601 5 90 202 1.07 2.41 5.9 13.8 2.7 5.4
16 2 4400 3200 15 201 5 179 404 2.13 4.82 11.3 27.4 5.3 10.7
16 10 1768 640 7065 7 127 285 1.51 3.39 8.0 19.6 2.3 4.6
16 22 4420 1600 17 661 7 316 712 3.77 8.48 19.3 47.7 5.7 11.5
nips
100 7 17 1061 1084 11
26 71 0.30 0.83 2.1 5.0 1.3 2.6
29† 76† 0.33† 0.89† 2.2† 5.3† 1.8† 3.1†
100 15 43 2750 2807 15
66 182 0.77 2.16 4.6 12.4 3.0 6.1
73† 196† 0.85† 2.33† 4.8† 12.9† 4.4† 7.4†
for accidents, baudio, and msweb, it takes roughly twice
the amount of RVs and edges (the SPN for msweb) compared to
the others to reach a significant runtime deviation.
3. When looking at the SPNs for nltcs, the first three SPNs have
roughly the same density and the runtime seems to scale according
to their size. The last two SPNs, however, have a noticeably higher
density but comparable size and result in much higher runtimes.
Thus, density (especially the amount of edges) is a much more
significant parameter than plain network size.
Yet, depending on the SPN, the costs of other, less important param-
eters can outweigh the costs of individual parameters. This is in line
with our theoretical analysis in Section 3.2: the circuit’s size depends
on the number of children (with different costs for sums and prod-
ucts) as well as the number of RVs and leaves. The amount of layers
has no direct effect because the round complexity of Yao’s GC pro-
tocol is independent of the depth. As for the regular SPNs for nips,
one can observe that the effects of hiding RV assignments are in-
significant compared to the overall performance.
Using 64-bit precision roughly doubles the costs of 32-bit pre-
cision, which is expected as the sub-circuits are about twice the
size [11]. Comparing the difference of the resulting log-probabilities
when evaluating the SPNs in CryptoSPN to the plain evalua-
tion with SPFlow, we get an RMSE of 4.2× 10−9 for 32-bit
and 2.3× 10−17 for 64-bit models. We stress that this insignificant
loss in accuracy is not due to the cryptographic measures, but rather
due to the more SMPC-friendly computation in the log2 domain.
6 CONCLUSION
Resolving privacy issues in ML applications is becoming a chal-
lenging duty for researchers, not least due to recent legal regula-
tions such as the GDPR. By combining efforts from both AI and
applied cryptography research, we presented CryptoSPN, which suc-
cessfully addresses this challenge for the evaluation of sum-product
networks (SPNs) that support a wide variety of desired ML tasks. The
protocols of CryptoSPN together with the tools developed for ML
experts deliver efficient yet extremely accurate SPN inference while
providing unprecedented protection guarantees that even cover the
network scope and structure. With our work serving as a foundation,
future research can investigate further efficiency improvements (e.g.,
via quantization techniques appropriate for SPNs), hiding the struc-
ture of SPNs that cannot be re-trained, and private SPN learning.
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